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Abstract 
 
We investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting: We examine how certain 
professional and political characteristics of FASB members and SEC commissioners predict the 
accounting “reliability” and “relevance” of proposed standards. Notably, we find FASB 
members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that 
decrease “reliability” and increase “relevance,” partly due to their tendency to propose fair-value 
methods. We find opposite results for FASB members affiliated with the Democratic Party, 
although only when excluding financial-services background as an independent variable. 
Jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter.  
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1. Introduction 
As the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) closes in on four decades, the role 
of its standards in shaping U.S. and international corporate reporting is widely acknowledged. 
An empirical literature on the political economy of FASB standard setting has emerged over that 
period to explore the origins of accounting standards largely through an analysis of constituent 
comment-letter lobbying (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). But such comment-letter lobbying 
is only part of the political economy that determines accounting standards (e.g., Ramanna, 2008, 
studies the role of congressional intervention). At the core of the standard-setting process are the 
individuals that comprise the FASB and its sanctioning authority, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). In this paper, we develop and test some exploratory hypotheses with a view 
towards building an understanding of the role of FASB and SEC regulators in U.S. GAAP. 
Although the idea that FASB and SEC regulators can matter in standard setting is 
intuitively appealing, it has not been subject to empirical testing. This is due in part to limited 
data availability, but also in part to neoclassical economics, which is widely used in accounting 
research and tends to view “individuals” as “so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of 
Occam’s razor in positive models” (e.g., Kalt and Zupan, 1984, p. 279). Recently, however, 
empiricists in finance and accounting have begun exploring the role of individuals on 
equilibrium outcomes, particularly in the context of individual managers and firm policies (e.g., 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber, Jiang, and Wang, 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 
2010). Moreover, in the regulation literature itself, there is some evidence of regulators’ 
preferences mattering in outcomes at both the congressional (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1979) and the 
bureaucratic agency levels (e.g., Gormley, 1979). Thus, in the context of accounting standard 2 
 
setting, tests of influence of FASB and SEC regulators can help refine our understanding of the 
political economy of U.S. GAAP.    
We conduct our study through an analysis of FASB exposure drafts proposed from 1973 
(the FASB’s inception) through 2007. There are 149 such exposure drafts in our sample after 
data limitations. Our primary tests involve regressing assessments of the nature of an exposure 
draft on the average background characteristics of extant FASB and SEC regulators.  
We evaluate a proposed SFAS (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards) by 
focusing in particular on its impact on accounting “relevance” and “reliability”—two 
characteristics usually cited as fundamental accounting properties in accounting textbooks (e.g., 
Stickney, Weil, Schipper, and Francis, 2010, pp. 23, 114). There are no obvious metrics to use in 
evaluating exposure drafts; our choice of “relevance” and “reliability” reflects our judgment on 
their importance to accounting. Since at least the publication of its conceptual statements in the 
late 1970s (e.g., FASB, 1978; 1980), the FASB itself has viewed “relevance” and “reliability” as 
“the two primary qualities that make accounting information useful for decision making” (FASB, 
1980, p. 5), adding that “serious disagreement” often arises “about whether the superior 
relevance of the results of one [accounting] method outweighs the superior reliability of the 
results of [another]” (FASB, 1980, p. 8). Moreover, the increased prominence, since the mid-
1990s, of fair-value accounting in standard setting has generated additional interest in the “trade-
off” between “relevance” and “reliability.” The FASB has often justified the increased use of fair 
values by arguing it will increase the “relevance” of accounting numbers (e.g., Johnson, 2005). 
In contrast, some academics have argued accounting estimates generated under fair-value 
accounting will decrease the “reliability” of financial reports (e.g., Watts, 2003).
1  
                                                            
1 While “reliability” and “relevance” can be trade-offs in some circumstances, it is an empirical question as to 
whether these concepts are always at odds with each other. 3 
 
To obtain assessments of exposure drafts’ impact on “relevance” and “reliability” that are 
independent of researcher judgment, we develop a measure based on comment letters filed by the 
Big 8/6/5/4 auditors (hereafter, “Big N auditors”). There are 908 such comment letters in our 
sample after data limitations. The advantage to using Big N auditors’ comment letters is that they 
are available on most exposure drafts in our sample period and are contemporaneous (i.e., no 
hindsight bias). The letters are, however, likely to reflect the auditors’ private incentives, which 
can confound inferences if endogenous to our explanatory variables (i.e., the characteristics of 
FASB and SEC regulators). To mitigate this concern, in robustness tests we use an alternative 
assessment of the exposure drafts from two seasoned research assistants (with over thirty years 
of combined experience in accounting) blind to the objective of this study.  
We build a biographical database of all 39 FASB members and all 41 SEC 
commissioners serving between 1973 and 2007. Drawing on empirical political-economy 
research that has examined the characteristics of regulators on regulation (see Dal Bo, 2006, for a 
review), we focus on two sets of characteristics: professional and political. The professional 
characteristics are length of regulatory tenure, industry background in auditing, and industry 
background in investment banking/ investment management (hereafter, “financial services”);
2 
the political characteristics are affiliations, if any, with the Democratic and Republican parties. 
Prior research has consistently found high correlations between regulators’ professional and 
political characteristics and so has examined these characteristics both independently and jointly 
in multivariate regressions. We adopt this approach in our empirical design.  
In examining professional characteristics independently, we find that longer average 
FASB and SEC tenures are associated with exposure drafts perceived by auditors as decreasing 
                                                            
2 When studying industry background, the regulatory literature has focused on industries most closely associated 
with the regulations being studied. In our setting, we focus on auditing and financial services, viewing them as front-
line intermediaries in the production and use of accounting information. 4 
 
accounting “reliability;” but, we find no evidence of an association between the regulators’ 
tenures and exposure drafts’ “relevance.” If decreased “reliability” is an undesirable property of 
accounting (e.g., Watts, 2003), the result is consistent with longer regulatory tenures 
compromising accounting quality.
3 Concerning industry backgrounds, we expect regulators with 
prior employment in auditing to be more sympathetic to accounting “reliability” (since “reliable” 
accounting lowers auditors’ litigation risk; e.g., Watts, 2003); in contrast, we expect members 
with prior employment in financial services to be sympathetic to valuation-relevant accounting 
(e.g., ICI, 2008), and thus more likely to promote “relevance” at the expense of “reliability” 
(e.g., Johnson, 2005). We do not find results associating regulators’ careers in auditing with 
“reliability” and “relevance.” However, we find evidence that exposure drafts proposed by FASB 
members and SEC commissioners with prior experience in financial services are viewed by the 
Big N auditors as decreasing accounting “reliability.” Further, in the case of FASB members, 
experience in financial services is associated with exposure drafts viewed by the Big N auditors 
as increasing accounting “relevance.” Additional analysis suggests these associations are partly 
due to the tendency of FASB members with financial-services backgrounds (the proportion of 
which increases in our sample period) to propose standards that use fair-value methods. 
In studying regulators’ political characteristics, we are motivated by prior political-
science research that has shown that political affiliations are salient predictors of regulator 
behavior: e.g., Cohen (1986) provides evidence that Democratic regulators are on average less 
sympathetic to corporate interests. In examining political characteristics independently, we find 
evidence that increased proportional membership of Democrats on the FASB is associated with 
exposure drafts that are perceived by the Big N auditors as both increasing accounting 
                                                            
3  Stigler (1971) argues that longer regulatory tenures compromise regulation by promoting greater “coziness” 
between regulators and the regulated. 5 
 
“reliability” and decreasing accounting “relevance.” However, when we examine the regulators’ 
professional and political characteristics jointly, we find that the results on backgrounds in 
financial services alone survive. Thus, in our population and time period, political affiliation 
does not appear to be a significant factor beyond financial services affiliation.  We note that there 
is no ex-ante theory that suggests either professional or political characteristics are more 
important than the other in explaining regulatory decisions (e.g., Dal Bo, 2006), thus future 
research is needed to draw more definitive conclusions.  
There are certain other caveats to our analysis. First, the small population of regulators in 
our study might mean that influential observations are driving reported statistical significance. 
We mitigate this concern through a jackknifing procedure where we re-estimate all regressions 
successively eliminating each regulator to determine if she/he is instrumental to inferences: this 
procedure does not alter inferences on variables discussed as statistically significant. Second, the 
scope of our study is limited by our choice of dependent and independent variables: other 
dependent variables (e.g., “comparability,” compliance costs, net-income effect) and independent 
variables (e.g., age, gender, education) can be considered. Thus, our findings should be 
interpreted as the result of a first look at the relationship between standard setters and GAAP.  
These caveats notwithstanding, the results described above are robust to numerous 
substantive and econometric controls, including controls for cross-sectional dependence of 
observations, auditor-specific effects, and aggregate market conditions. Additionally, we conduct 
a number of sensitivity tests, including (i) using research assistants’ (instead of the Big N 
auditors’) evaluations of exposure drafts; (ii) assigning greater weight to FASB and SEC 
chairmen when calculating the average background characteristics of extant regulators (to assess 
if chairmen are more important in standard setting); and (iii) restricting our analysis to periods of 6 
 
economic growth (to assess the sensitivity of our findings to broader macroeconomic 
conditions). These results are discussed in Section 5.  
Broadly, the evidence in this paper suggests individual standard setters have equilibrium 
effects on standard setting. Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner (2010) summarize two theories to 
explain accounting standard setting: “capture” and “ideology.” Under capture theory, constituent 
lobbying determines standard-setting outcomes since regulators are “captured” by their special-
interest constituents; under ideology theory, constituent lobbying is only one input to standard 
setting, which is also influenced by regulators’ ideologies. If accounting standard setting is more 
aptly described by ideology theory, one would expect to see the systematic impact of regulators’ 
characteristics in accounting standards, as we find. However, empirically it is difficult to rule out 
“capture” because the selection of regulators is itself a political process, which may be beholden 
to special interests. For example, our findings associating the growing proportion of FASB 
members from financial services to fair-value standards can be explained by the growth of the 
financial-services sector over our sample period: changing political economies associated with 
the growth of finance may have resulted in the increased proportion of finance-industry veterans 
on the FASB, who in turn proposed fair-value standards. Going forward, a research program in 
this area that draws on our initial look at the question can provide additional insights into the role 
of individual regulators and special-interest politics on the nature of accounting regulation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the motivation for our 
research-design choices and discusses associated limitations. Section 3 describes the construction 
of variables and develops associated hypotheses. Section 4 discusses descriptive statistics and the 
multivariate regression strategy. Section 5 presents and interprets the multivariate results, 
including robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  7 
 
2. Motivating research-design choices 
2.1. Which dependent variables? 
To empirically assess the role of standard setters in standard setting, we require a 
reasonable and parsimonious metric to evaluate proposed standards. The analogous literature that 
explores the role of individual managers in firm policies generally employs explicit performance 
and governance metrics such as earnings, stock returns, disclosure standards, and accounting 
quality.
4 Such obvious metrics are not applicable to our setting. In evaluating standards, we use 
“reliability” and “relevance” as discussed above. “Reliability” and “relevance” are widely 
viewed as being among accounting’s “fundamental qualitative characteristics” by both 
academics (e.g., Stickney et al., 2010, p. 765; Dyckman, Magee, and Pfeiffer, 2011) and the 
FASB (e.g., FASB, 1978; 1980).
5,6 In addition to “reliability” and “relevance,” there are likely 
other possible metrics to evaluate accounting standards, including “comparability,” 
“consistency,” and whether the standards are income increasing. In this sense, there is 
considerable scope for additional research along the lines we have pursued.  
 
2.2. Which independent variables? 
In selecting the characteristics of FASB members and SEC commissioners to study, we 
are motivated by prior political-economy research in this area. Dal Bo (2006), in a recent review, 
                                                            
4 See, for example, Bamber et al. (2010); Dyreng et al. (2010); and Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011).  
5 The classification of standards as along “reliability” and “relevance” can also be related to research on the demands 
of debtholders versus equityholders on financial reporting practices. Debtholders are usually seen as demanding 
“reliability” (e.g., Watts, 2003), while equityholders are seen as demanding either “relevance” (e.g., Barth, 2006) or 
both “reliability” and “relevance” (e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
6 Recently, the FASB modified its conceptual framework to move away from “reliability” towards “representational 
faithfulness.” This change was likely made (at least in part) due to criticisms that the FASB was undermining the 
“reliability” of accounting standards (e.g., Watts, 2003). In response to these criticisms, some FASB members 
argued that “reliability” had been “misunderstood” to mean “verifiability;” the concept of “representational 
faithfulness” was advanced to replace “reliability” (e.g., Schipper, 2005). The change was proposed at a joint FASB-
IASB board meeting on May 25, 2005, and the change was introduced into the conceptual framework in 2010. Since 
the change was initiated towards the end of our sample period, and went into effect after our sample period, we use 
“reliability,” not “representational faithfulness,” in our analyses.  8 
 
notes that empirical research on the role of regulators in regulation, while (p. 215) “well short of 
abundant,” has largely focused on regulators’ professional characteristics—particularly, industry 
backgrounds—and regulators’ political party affiliation. In addition, he points to empirical work 
on the role of regulators’ terms-in-office on regulatory outcomes. Given the exploratory nature of 
our study, we focus on these independent variables. 
On industry backgrounds, ex ante, we have a broad choice of industry classifications to 
organize the data (e.g., SIC codes). However, given the limited number of FASB members 
(n=39) and SEC commissioners (n=41) in our sample period, we are unable to use such broad-
based industry classifications. Prior empirical research on regulators’ industry backgrounds has 
focused on industries most closely associated with those regulations (e.g., Cohen, 1986, studies 
whether Federal Communications Commission, FCC, regulators with broadcasting industry 
experience are more supportive of that industry). In our case of studying accounting standard 
setting, we identify auditing and financial services as the most closely associated industries. We 
focus on backgrounds in auditing because accounting and auditing are joint products in financial 
reporting and because of the historical evidence on the close input of the audit industry in 
standard setting (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1982, 1983). We focus on backgrounds in 
financial services because the financial services industry is a front-line intermediary in using 
accounting information. This includes investment management, which uses accounting 
information on the buy side, and investment banking, which uses accounting information on the 
sell-side. Thus, we expect an investigation of standard setters with backgrounds in auditing and 
financial services to provide a useful lens into standard setting.
7 
                                                            
7 In addition to tenure lengths, industry backgrounds, and party affiliation, it is possible that other characteristics of 
FASB and SEC regulators also matter. For example, in the context of studying the idiosyncratic styles of CEOs, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) examine whether managers’ age, gender, and education matter. In unreported tests, we 
examine whether such characteristics of FASB and SEC regulators are systematically associated with the standards 9 
 
2.3. Limitations of the research design  
We attempt to provide some empirical evidence on the role of standard setters in standard 
setting. Such evidence can complement existing findings on the role of constituent comment-
letter lobbying and congressional intervention in standard setting (see Kothari et al., 2010, for a 
recent review). Empirically, we focus on the association between standard setters and the 
exposure drafts they propose. Exposure drafts appear prior to direct comment-letter lobbying and 
thus provide a relatively clean setting (relative to final standards) to examine the role of standard 
setters. Of course, constituent lobbying can influence the exposure draft process as well, but such 
ex-ante lobbying is difficult to observe, and our research design does not address its possible 
effects on standard setting. Further, it is possible that the selection of regulators to the FASB and 
SEC is itself a function of constituent lobbying. Such lobbying, in turn, is likely driven by extant 
economic and political circumstances, for example, macroeconomic conditions, globalization 
(e.g., growth of IFRS), the rise of the financial services sector, or the rise of information 
technologies.
8 While our research design allows us to infer a role for standard setters in standard 
setting, it does not allow us to conclusively establish whether this role derives from some 
intrinsic ideology of regulators or from prevailing political economies.  
   
3. Variable measurement and hypotheses 
3.1. Dependent variables: decreased “reliability” and increased “relevance” 
To evaluate the FASB exposure drafts in our sample period independently of researcher 
judgment, we rely on two separate methods. First, we examine relevant comment letters filed by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
they propose. We also test whether the regulators’ backgrounds in academia and government systematically vary 
with their proposals.  The results are inconclusive. 
8 On the role of macroeconomics on regulation, Bertomeu and Magee (2011) propose a model where accounting 
regulators are subject to different political pressures during different stages of the economic cycle.  10 
 
the Big N auditors. Second, we use two research assistants who are blind to the objectives of the 
study to manually assess the exposure drafts (this process is described later in the sub-section).  
The key advantage to using Big N auditors’ comment letters is that they provide a 
consistent and contemporaneous source of exposure-draft evaluations. The evaluations are 
consistent in that the Big N auditors comment on a large majority of exposure drafts in our 
sample period, so we do not have to rely on evaluations from disparate sources. The evaluations 
are contemporaneous in that the letters do not suffer from hindsight bias. Moreover, Big N 
auditors are sophisticated consumers of accounting standards, so we expect their evaluations to 
have information content.  
The changing industrial organization of the U.S. auditing oligopoly means that our set of 
“Big N auditors” begins with the “Big 8” in 1973 and ends with the “Big 4” in 2007. Table 1 
provides a timeline of the changing dynamics of the U.S. audit industry. There are 170 distinct 
FASB exposure drafts that became 163 distinct SFAS in our sample period, 1973–2007. The 
absence of Big N auditor comments letters on six SFAS over that period decreases our sample 
size to 157 SFAS (Table 1 provides details on the SFAS without comment letters). These 157 
SFAS can be traced back to 149 distinct exposure drafts (several exposure drafts resulted in 
multiple SFAS). There are collectively 908 unique comment letters by the Big N auditors on the 
149 exposure drafts. We obtain paper copies of these comment letters from the FASB archives in 
Norwalk, Connecticut, and then digitize the comment letters using a combination of optical 
character recognition software and manual transcription. The digitized letters are then analyzed 
for contextually relevant occurrences of word stems “relevan” and “reliab” to create our auditor-
based measures of the exposure drafts’ impact on decreased “reliability” and increased 
“relevance” using a process described in Appendix A. Based on that process, we define two 11 
 
variables, inc_relv and dec_relb, intended to capture the intensity of auditors’ concerns that a 
proposed standard will increase “relevance” and decrease “reliability,” respectively. The 
variables inc_relv and dec_relb are defined as follows. For each Big N auditor comment letter 
“i” on a proposed SFAS “j”:   
   _        1 
  _   _    	  
  	  
 …  (1) 
   _        1 
  _   _    	  
  	  
 …  (2) 
In the above equations,   _   _    	  	is the word count of the first instance of the word 
stem “relevan” used in the context of increased “relevance” in comment letter “i” on proposed 
SFAS “j;”   _   _    	  	is the word count of the first instance of the word stem “reliab” used 
in the context of decreased “reliability” in comment letter “i” on proposed SFAS “j;”   	  	is the 
total word count of comment letter “i” on proposed SFAS “j.” In measuring inc_relv and 
dec_relb, we focus on the relative positions of the word stems “relevan” and “reliab” within a 
comment letter in order to get a measure of the relative importance of the auditors’ sentiments on 
“relevance” and “reliability.” The implicit assumption is that the stronger an auditor feels on 
“relevance” or “reliability,” the earlier the concept will be discussed in the comment letter.
9 By 
construction, inc_relv and dec_relb are confined to the range [0, 1] and are expected to increase 
in the strength of an auditor’s opinion of an exposure draft’s impact on increased “relevance” 
and decreased “reliability,” respectively. 
                                                            
9 This assumption is consistent with the usual format of comment letters, which generally begin with an introductory 
paragraph highlighting key issues before tackling technical details in the body of the letter. Thus, if “relevance” and 
“reliability” are sufficiently important concerns for a letter writer, we expect the terms to be mentioned in the 
introductory paragraph, resulting in higher scores on inc_relv and dec_relb. In untabulated analysis, we tested the 
robustness of our results to this assumption by defining alternative binary dependent variables that are not sensitive 
to the relative location of substantive references to “relevance” and “reliability.”  Results of this analysis are 
inconsistent with the concern that location-based construction may be driving our primary results.   12 
 
The Big N auditors’ evaluations of exposure drafts are likely to be influenced by their 
private incentives: for example, if auditors are biased towards identifying decreased “reliability” 
over increased “relevance” because of litigation concerns, or if auditors are biased by the extant 
composition of their client base.
10 In our tests, we do not expect these incentives to be correlated 
with our independent variables (i.e., the characteristics of FASB and SEC regulators), thus we 
expect these biases to add a scalar or a random variable to the regressand. Nevertheless, to 
mitigate the concern that auditor incentives can affect inferences in our tests, we supplement our 
auditor-based evaluations of the FASB exposure drafts with manual assessments by two research 
assistants who are blind to the objectives of the study but have extensive experience and practical 
familiarity with accounting. We use the standard dual-coder model in having the research 
assistants evaluate the exposure drafts. That is, the research assistants first independently 
evaluate each exposure draft based on a rubric discussed in Appendix B; then, the research 
assistants meet to resolve, if possible, instances of disagreement in their assessments. Of the 170 
exposure drafts that became the 163 SFAS in our sample period, we are able to obtain, from the 
FASB archives, copies of 145 exposure drafts representing 137 distinct SFAS. Copies of the 
remaining exposure drafts, all dating from the 1980s and before, are not readily available in the 
FASB archive.
11 The 145 exposure drafts are manually assessed and then merged with the 149 
exposure drafts for which we have auditor-based evaluations, yielding a common sample of 126 
exposure drafts. In the subsequent section, we explore the correlation in our dependent variables 
across the auditor and research-assistant evaluations. The research assistants’ evaluations of 
                                                            
10 Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) provide some survey-based evidence on auditors’ incentives.  
11 In the case of several exposure drafts from the 1980s and before, only one paper copy exists at the FASB archive. 
The FASB publications department is in the process of digitizing all historic records, but the exposure drafts missing 
from our study were not available at the time we conducted the analysis. 13 
 
decreased “reliability” and increased “relevance” are denoted Manual_dec_relb and 
Manual_inc_relv, respectively. 
 
3.2. Independent variables: characteristics of FASB members and SEC commissioners 
As noted earlier, our primary tests focus on the professional characteristics (i.e., tenure 
lengths and industry backgrounds) and political characteristics (i.e., party affiliations) of FASB 
members and SEC commissioners, because prior literature has studied these variables in the 
context of other regulators (e.g., Gormley, 1979; Cohen, 1986; Dal Bo, 2006, Leaver, 2009). The 
first FASB members took office in 1973 (shortly after the FASB’s founding), and there have 
been 39 members on the board through December 2007. For each of these 39 members, we 
collect data on their length of tenure on the FASB, their backgrounds, if any, in auditing and 
financial services, and their political affiliations. In the same period, there have been 41 SEC 
commissioners, and we collect similar data on the commissioners. 
Data on the duration of service on the board and the most recent employer prior to 
appointment to the board for FASB members are obtained primarily from two sources: (1) press 
notices issued by the FASB at a member’s initial appointment; and (2) the FASB’s annual 
informational bulletin, “Facts about FASB.” We create two non-exhaustive indicator variables to 
classify the members’ pre-FASB employers for further analysis: the first variable identifies 
whether a member worked for an audit firm prior to joining the board; the second whether the 
member worked for an investment bank or investment management firm. The equivalent data on 
the SEC commissioners’ tenure and professional background are obtained from the SEC’s 
historical archives, as well as from newspaper biographies of the commissioners (usually 
published upon the commissioners’ initial appointment). 14 
 
In addition, we also build a database of the 39 FASB members’ political affiliations. 
Conceptually, we are interested in whether the members identify as Democrats or Republicans. 
Since members of the FASB are not explicit political appointees (they are appointed by the non-
governmental Financial Accounting Foundation), the members’ party affiliations are not readily 
known. Thus, we infer members’ political identities by studying the history of their campaign 
contributions (if any). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) archives data on campaign 
contributions over $200 by U.S. individuals. Members contributing to the Democratic Party are 
coded as Democrats; those contributing to the Republican Party are coded Republicans; while 
members not contributing to either party are not assigned a political identity.
12 In the case of 
SEC commissioners, party affiliations are declared at or prior to appointment, so political 
identities need not be inferred from campaign contributions.  
Our empirical tests are concerned with evaluating the influence of FASB and SEC 
regulators on exposure drafts. Accordingly, for each exposure draft in our sample, we average 
the personal characteristics of all FASB members and SEC commissioners in office at the time. 
For example, for the exposure draft that became SFAS 106, we average across the seven FASB 
members and five SEC commissioners in office as of February 1989 (the date the exposure draft 
was issued) their lengths of service on the board (hereafter, Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC, 
respectively). Similarly, we compute across the members and commissioners, the proportion 
with prior employment in auditing (hereafter, % Auditor FASB and % Auditor SEC, 
respectively), the proportion with prior employment in investment banking/ investment 
management (hereafter, % Financial FASB and % Financial SEC, respectively), the proportion 
contributing to the Democratic Party (hereafter, % Dem Donor FASB and % Democrat SEC, 
                                                            
12 To the extent that the FEC database is not comprehensive, our measure of political contributions is measured with 
error. However, we are not aware of any reason for the FEC excluding contributors over $200.   15 
 
respectively). We also compute the proportion of FASB members contributing to the Republican 
Party (hereafter, % Rep Donor FASB). An equivalent variable for SEC commissioners is 
obviated by the fact that the proportion of Republicans and Democrats in the SEC sample is 
collectively exhaustive. In subsequent empirical tests, we do not include % Auditor SEC because 
only one of the 41 SEC commissioners that served during our sample period worked for an audit 
firm prior to appointment to the commission.  
The assumption implicit in averaging FASB members’ and SEC commissioners’ 
characteristics by exposure draft is that these documents represent the average position of the 
members and commissioners, respectively, in office at the time.
13 In sensitivity tests described 
later, we examine the robustness of our results to assigning greater weight to FASB and SEC 
chairmen when calculating the average background characteristics.   
 
3.3. Hypotheses development 
Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC can be used to assess the impact of the average length of 
standard-setters’ terms on regulatory capture. In the classical economic theory of regulation 
(Stigler, 1971), longer terms (i.e., higher values of Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC) signify greater 
“coziness” between regulators and the regulated, compromising regulatory outcomes. However, 
Leaver (2009) develops and tests a model of regulation where longer terms insulate regulators 
from political pressure, thus improving regulatory outcomes. If decreased “reliability” is an 
undesirable accounting property, a positive association between Tenure FASB/Tenure SEC and 
our proxies for decreased “reliability” (i.e., dec_relb and Manual_dec_relb) is consistent with 
longer term-lengths compromising regulatory outcomes per Stigler’s theory. Similarly, if 
                                                            
13 The maximum number of FASB members (SEC commissioners) at any given time during our sample period is 
seven (five). However, because new members do not immediately take office upon the resignation of another 
member, the size of the board can on occasion be less than seven (five).   16 
 
increased “relevance” augments accounting, a negative association between Tenure 
FASB/Tenure SEC and our proxies for increased “relevance” (i.e., inc_relv and 
Manual_inc_relv) is consistent with Stigler’s theory.   
% Auditor FASB, % Financial FASB, and % Financial SEC can be used to assess the 
impact of FASB members’ and SEC commissioners’ industry backgrounds on accounting 
standard setting. Prior research in political science has shown that regulators tend to be more 
supportive of the industries they hail from (perhaps because they seek employment or consulting 
opportunities in those industries upon completion of their regulatory terms, e.g., Cohen, 1986). 
Given their role in assuring financial reports, and the substantial legal liability associated with 
this role (e.g., Kellogg, 1984; Watts, 2003), we expect auditors, ex ante, to be more sympathetic 
to standards promoting “reliability” at the expense of “relevance.” Moreover, if accounting 
regulators’ industry backgrounds matter in standard setting, FASB members and SEC 
commissioners with backgrounds in auditing will, ceteris paribus, be more likely associated with 
standards promoting “reliability” (potentially over “relevance”). Thus, we predict negative 
coefficients between % Auditor FASB and our proxies for both decreased “reliability” and 
increased “relevance.” In contrast, ceteris paribus, we expect FASB members and SEC 
commissioners with backgrounds in financial services (defined as investment banking and 
investment management) to be more supportive of standards expected to improve accounting’s 
relevance through the use of fair values.
14 Moreover, if the FASB is correct about its arguments 
linking fair values to increased “relevance” and, sometimes, decreased “reliability” (Johnson, 
2005), regulatory backgrounds in financial services are likely to result in standards with such 
                                                            
14 Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this conjecture: e.g., the Investment Company Institute, the U.S. industry 
association for investment management firms, has strongly supported the use of fair-value accounting (ICI, 2008). 
Further, the Big 3 investment banks—Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch—were all enthusiastic 
supporters of fair-value-based rules for mergers and acquisitions, including in subsequent goodwill impairment 
testing, during the standard-setting process for SFAS 141 and 142 (e.g., Ramanna, 2006).  17 
 
properties. Thus, we predict positive coefficients between % Financial FASB/ % Financial SEC 
and our proxies for both increased “relevance” and decreased “reliability.”  
The empirical literature in political science has also considered the implications of 
regulators’ political affiliations on regulations, finding that Democratic regulators are on average 
less sympathetic to regulations benefiting corporate interests (Dal Bo, 2006). Extending this 
finding to accounting regulations, we can expect Democratic FASB and SEC regulators to be 
more sympathetic to standards that mitigate corporations’ information advantage over outsiders. 
Evidence that corporations’ information advantage benefits managers, e.g., Healy and Whalen 
(1999), is germane to this prediction. Such benefits can engender anti-corporate sentiment (e.g., a 
perception that managers exploit information advantages to receive “excess compensation”) that 
is more likely to resonate with Democrats. Linking Democrats’ relative focus on mitigating 
corporations’ information advantage to promoting “reliability” over “relevance” is trickier. On 
the one hand, increased “reliability” over “relevance” can mitigate corporations’ information 
asymmetry over outsiders because: (1) ceteris paribus, managers are inherently more likely to 
emphasize good news over bad news (e.g., Kothari, Shu, Wysocki, 2009); (2) regulatory 
solutions that are focused on mitigating corporations’ information advantage emphasize, on 
average, timely discussion of bad news (e.g., Watts, 2003); and (3) such solutions—conservatism 
and verifiability—result in greater “reliability” over “relevance” (e.g., Kothari et al., 2010, p. 
256). On the other hand, firms themselves have incentives to prefer “reliability” to “relevance,” 
for example, corporations can benefit from accounting conservatism (e.g., through lower capital 
costs; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Zhang, 2008). Thus, the equilibrium relation between % Dem 
Donor FASB/  % Democrat SEC and our proxies for increased “relevance”/ decreased 
“reliability” is an empirical question. Ex ante, we have no prediction on % Rep Donor FASB. 18 
 
Nevertheless, we include this variable in our analysis because % Dem Donor FASB and % Rep 
Donor FASB are not collectively exhaustive, and an analysis with % Rep Donor FASB can 
provide additional insights.
15  
 
4. Descriptive statistics and multivariate research design 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Appendix C provides a summary definition of all variables in the study. Table 2, Panel A, 
reports summary statistics for our measures of decreased “reliability” (dec_relb and 
Manual_dec_relb) and increased “relevance” (inc_relv and Manual_inc_relv). The comment-
letter-based statistics are for the 908 Big N auditor comment letters, and the manually assessed 
statistics are for the 145 exposure drafts examined by our research assistants. The mean value of 
dec_relb ( Manual_dec_relb) is 0.07 (0.31) and the median value is zero (zero). There is 
considerable variation in dec_relb (standard deviation is 0.22), and much of the variation is 
across (and not within) proposed standards. The maximum average value of dec_relb is observed 
on the exposure draft for SFAS 141R, Business Combinations. A major provision in this 
exposure draft was to allow an acquirer to recognize acquired net assets at their fair values, 
without regard to the cost of the acquisition. Eliminating acquisition cost as the upper bound for 
net-asset-value recognition can introduce considerable subjectivity in financial reporting; thus it 
seems reasonable that SFAS 141R’s exposure draft received a high dec_relb score. 
                                                            
15 Two additional factors can confound predictions on political affiliation. First, the variables % Dem Donor FASB 
and % Rep Donor FASB are not collectively exhaustive because we cannot identify the political affiliation, if any, 
for FASB members in our sample who have never made campaign contributions in excess of $200.  Second, the 
political distance between Democrats and Republicans on the FASB is unlikely to be as wide as that in the general 
population, because FASB members are usually drawn from the relatively homogenous business community 
(including investors’ representatives). 19 
 
The mean value of inc_relv ( Manual_inc_relv) is 0.04 (0.65). The median values of 
inc_relv and Manual_inc_relv are zero. The standard deviation of inc_relv is 0.17 (over four 
times the mean), suggesting, as with dec_relb, that there is considerable variance among 
comment letters in their assessments on increased “relevance.” In unreported tests, we find that 
over two-thirds of this variation is across (and not within) proposed standards. The maximum 
average value of inc_relv for any given proposed SFAS is observed on the exposure draft for 
SFAS 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities. SFAS 159 is a 
standard intended to “improve relevance of financial statements” (FASB, 2007), so the high 
inc_relv score on the exposure draft is consistent with inc_relv measuring increased “relevance.”   
In untabulated tests, we further examine the validity of inc_relv and dec_relb as measures 
of increased “relevance” and decreased “reliability,” respectively. Specifically, we randomly 
sampled 54 of the 908 big auditor comment letters (6%) to manually assess whether the letters 
expressed sentiments on increased “relevance” and decreased “reliability.” In all but five of the 
54 sampled letters (9%), our evaluation agreed with inc_relv and dec_relb. In all five exceptions, 
inc_relv and dec_relb were coded zero because the actual word stems “relevan” and “reliab” 
were never used, while our manual assessment was that the letters did in fact express sentiments 
on increased relevance and/or decreased reliability (i.e., there are no false positives in the coding 
of inc_relv and dec_relb). The 9% misclassification refers exclusively to false negatives, which 
essentially result in a low power issue, biasing against finding results.  
Table 2, Panel B, reports Pearson (Spearman above the diagonal) correlation coefficients 
between the dependent variables discussed above. The p-values on the correlation coefficients 20 
 
are based on clustering at the SFAS level.
16 The  variables  dec_relb and Manual_dec_relb 
(inc_relv and Manual_inc_relv) are significantly correlated with each other, ρ=0.341 (ρ=0.203), 
at the 95% confidence level or higher, suggesting that our comment-letter-based proxies and our 
manually assessed proxies capture similar concepts. The various proxies for decreased 
“reliability” and increased “relevance” are also significantly correlated with each other. This 
result is consistent with the FASB’s conception of “relevance” and “reliability” as trade-offs.  
Table 3, Panel A, reports summary statistics for the FASB members’ and SEC 
commissioners’ personal characteristics. These measures constitute the set of explanatory 
variables in subsequent regression-based tests. The mean value of Tenure FASB is 4.2 and the 
median is 4.3, suggesting that, on average, an exposure draft is issued by a board with just over 
four years of individual service experience. In contrast, the mean and median values of Tenure 
SEC are 3.1 and 3.0, respectively, suggesting SEC commissioners are on average less 
experienced in their extant jobs. Figure 1 plots the time series of Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC 
over the sample period. There does not appear to be any discernible time trend in average service 
experience on the two bodies. 
On average, about 40% of FASB members were most recently employed in auditing (% 
Auditor FASB), while about 4% of FASB members were most recently employed in investment 
banking/ investment management (% Financial FASB). Figure 2 plots the time series of these 
two variables over the 1973–2007 period: % Auditor FASB appears to have held steady over 
time, while % Financial FASB, which was zero through about the mid-1990s, appears to have 
increased to just under 30% in 2007. The average proportion of SEC commissioners most 
recently employed in financial services (% Financial SEC), at 15%, is higher than the 
                                                            
16 That is, significance of correlation coefficients is computed using the t distribution as    
 ∗√   
               2     , 
where   is the Pearson correlation coefficient and   is the number of clusters (i.e., SFAS). 21 
 
corresponding FASB statistic. Figure 2 also plots the trend in % Financial SEC, which appears 
to show considerable time series variation.  
The average (median) proportion of FASB members contributing to the Democratic 
Party, % Dem Donor FASB, is 16.73% (14%). The statistics are similar for % Rep Donor FASB 
at 18% (14%). Figure 3 plots the time series of these two variables: % Dem Donor FASB is 
higher than % Rep Donor FASB in the first few years of the FASB’s existence, while % Rep 
Donor FASB is higher in the period between 1995 and 2002. The average proportion of 
Democratic SEC commissioners (% Democrat SEC) is 45%, which indicates the average statistic 
for Republican SEC commissioners in about 55%. Overall, the partisan proportions for SEC 
commissioners are higher than those for FASB members because the former are known with 
certainty and are collectively exhaustive in the sample. The time series variation in % Democrat 
SEC (Figure 4) is predictable, given that commissioners are appointed by the U.S. president.
17 
Pearson correlations (Spearman above the diagonal) between the explanatory variables in 
Panel A, Table 3 are shown in Panel B, Table 3. Statistical inferences are based on clustering by 
year. There are strong correlations between the background variables (i.e., tenure and prior 
employment) and the personal politics variables among FASB members and SEC 
commissioners. For example, Tenure FASB is positively associated with % Rep Donor FASB 
(0.428) and negatively associated with % Dem Donor FASB (-0.521); % Auditor FASB is 
positively associated with both % Rep Donor FASB (0.216) and % Dem Donor FASB (0.519). 
Also, % Financial SEC is negatively associated with % Democrat SEC. These correlations are 
                                                            
17 No more than three of the five SEC commissioners at any given time can belong to the same party; so, for 
example, a Democratic U.S. president cannot name five Democrats to the commission. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of SEC commissioners from the same party does sometimes exceed three-fifths because of vacancies and time lags 
between appointments.  22 
 
consistent with findings in prior research involving the backgrounds and personal politics of 
FCC commissioners (e.g., Gormley, 1979; Cohen, 1986).  
 
4.2. Multivariate research design 
We are interested in assessing how our measures of FASB proposals’ impact on 
“reliability” and “relevance” vary with characteristics of standard setters. Accordingly, the 
dependent variables in our regressions are variously, dec_relb, inc_relv, Manual_dec_relb, and 
Manual_inc_relv. In specifying the explanatory variables in these regressions, we follow prior 
research on regulators by examining the effect of professional and political characteristics both 
independently and jointly. In the first set of regressions, we only include as explanatory variables 
the measures of FASB and SEC regulators’ professional characteristics:  Tenure FASB,  % 
Auditor FASB,  % Financial FASB, Tenure SEC, and % Financial SEC. We do not include 
measures of the regulators’ political characteristics because of the high observed correlations 
between political and personal characteristics.
18 Appropriately,  results  from such regressions 
must be interpreted as exploratory, not definitive. The formal specification for our first set of 
regressions is given in equation (3).  
                   	     ,%       	      ,%         	     , 
      	     ,%         	     …(3) 
In equation (3), “i” is a big auditor comment letter and “j” is an exposure draft. Standard 
errors in estimating equation (3) are clustered two-ways, by proposed SFAS and big auditor 
                                                            
18 In his review of the literature on regulators’ impact on regulation, Dal Bo (2006) notes that (p. 217) “although 
industry background seems to matter, it is not clear that it has a very strong effect once one considers the role of 
political affiliations.” He attributes this result to the high correlations, noting, for example, that in the case of the 
FCC, “no Democratic administration appointed a commissioner with [broadcasting] industry background” during 
the 1955–1974 period. In essence, there is no ex-ante theory that suggests either professional or political 
characteristics are more important than the other in explaining regulatory decisions, and, given the given the high 
correlations and small sample sizes in these regressions, there is some value to examining professional and political 
characteristics independently. 23 
 
(using the method described in Petersen, 2009). We estimate two specifications of equation (3) 
(and all subsequent regressions), one with Big N auditor fixed effects and one without. The Big 
N auditor fixed effects specifically identify the “Big 5” auditors; thus for example, a comment 
letter by Touche Ross from the period preceding the establishment of Deloitte & Touche will be 
identified by a Deloitte & Touche fixed effect. 
We test for the association between our dependent variables and the FASB and SEC 
regulators’ political characteristics (i.e., % Dem Donor FASB, % Rep Donor FASB, % Democrat 
SEC) in a second set of regressions. The formal specification for our second set of regressions is 
given in equation (4) below. 
              %       	           	          ,%   	     	     ,%        	      …(4) 
In equation (4), DepVar and the subscripts “i” and “j” are as defined in equation (3). 
Standard error clusters are also as described earlier.  
In a final set of regressions, we include all independent variables described in equations 
(3) and (4). Coefficients in all regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). We 
report results both with and without controls for two market-based variables: the annual value-
weighted market return (VWRETD) and the standard deviation of the daily value-weighted 
market return (sd_VWRETD) in the twelve months preceding the issuance of a proposed SFAS.  
 
5. Multivariate results 
5.1. Results using Big N auditors’ comment letters  
Table 4 reports OLS estimation results where the measure of decreased “reliability” from 
auditor comment letters (dec_relb) is the dependent variable. There are seven columns to Table 
4. In the first three columns, FASB members’ and SEC commissioners’ professional 24 
 
characteristics are the explanatory variables (as in equation (3)); in columns four to six, FASB 
members’ and SEC commissioners’ political affiliations are the explanatory variables (as in 
equation (4)); the seventh column reports the regression combining all explanatory variables. In 
the first and fourth columns, we do not include the market-based variables, VWRETD and 
sd_VWRETD, as temporal economic controls; in all other columns, these variables are included. 
In addition, columns two and five do not include auditor fixed effects, whereas columns three, 
six, and seven do. In the following discussion, we focus on the results from columns three, six, 
and seven, since these columns have the most exhaustive specifications, only discussing the 
other columns when inferences differ. All regressions in Table 4 use the sample of 908 comment 
letters.  Standard errors in all regressions are clustered by Big N auditor and SFAS, and are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. 
When professional characteristics are examined independently, we find both Tenure 
FASB and Tenure SEC are positively associated with decreased “reliability,” suggesting that 
longer terms of service on the FASB and SEC are associated with a perception of decreased 
accounting “reliability” (the coefficient on Tenure FASB is insignificant when market-based 
controls are excluded). If decreased “reliability” is an undesirable accounting property, this result 
is consistent with longer term-lengths compromising regulatory outcomes, per Stigler’s theory of 
regulation. To put the coefficients’ magnitudes in perspective, the implication from column (3) is 
that a one standard deviation increase in FASB tenure (SEC tenure) is associated with a decrease 
in “reliability” that is about 30% (38%) of the mean dec_relb value. We also find evidence that 
% Financial FASB and % Financial SEC are positive and significant predictors of FASB 
proposals perceived as decreasing accounting “reliability.” A one standard deviation increase in 
% Financial FASB (% Financial SEC) is associated with a decrease in “reliability” that is about 25 
 
74% (49%) of the mean dec_relb value. This evidence is consistent with the proposition that a 
prior career in investment banking/ investment management predisposes standard setters to 
produce standards that deemphasize accounting “reliability.” Contrary to our expectations, we 
find no evidence in Table 4 linking % Auditor FASB and decreased “reliability.” 
When political characteristics are examined independently, the coefficient on % Dem 
Donor FASB is significant and negative in explaining dec_relb. The implication from column (6) 
is that a one standard deviation increase in % Dem Donor FASB is associated with an increase in 
“reliability” that is about 64% of the mean dec_relb value. The evidence suggests that increased 
proportional representation of Democrats on the FASB is associated with the production of 
standards that are viewed as increasing accounting “reliability.” We do not find a similar result 
with the proportion of Democrats on the SEC.  
In combining all explanatory variables in column (7), only the results on % Financial 
FASB and % Financial SEC are statistically significant. This result is consistent with prior 
studies that combine regulators’ professional and political characteristics, where high 
correlations between these variables and the small population size are seen to confound statistical 
inferences (Dal Bo, 2006). However, in unreported tests we find variance inflation factors from 
this regression are inconsistent with severe multicollinearity suggesting that, for our sample, 
financial services affiliation is the overriding explanatory variable.  
Table 5 reports OLS estimation results where the measure of increased “relevance” from 
auditor comment letters (inc_relv) is the dependent variable. Table 5 is otherwise identical to 
Table 4 in all respects. As in Table 4, we focus on discussing results from columns three, six, and 
seven of Table 5. When professional characteristics alone are the explanatory variables, we find 
only % Financial FASB is a positive and significant predictor of FASB proposals perceived as 26 
 
increasing accounting “relevance.” In column (3), one standard deviation increase in % 
Financial FASB is associated with an increase in “relevance” that is about 73% of its mean 
value. This evidence is consistent with the proposition that a prior career in investment banking/ 
investment management predisposes standard setters to produce standards that increase 
accounting “relevance.” When political characteristics alone are the explanatory variables, we 
find % Dem Donor FASB is significant and negative in explaining inc_relv. In column (6), one 
standard deviation increase in % Dem Donor FASB is associated with a decrease in “relevance” 
that is about 65% of the mean inc_relv value. Column (6) also reveals a statistically negative 
association between % Rep Donor FASB and proposals perceived as increasing “relevance.” We 
are not aware of a theory to interpret this result. In combining all explanatory variables in 
column (7) of Table 5, only the coefficient on % Financial FASB is statistically significant.  
To summarize the key findings from Tables 4 and 5: across tests using auditor comment 
letters, the data are consistent with the proposition that a prior career in financial services 
predisposes FASB standard setters to favor accounting “relevance” over “reliability.” 
 
5.2. Results using manual assessments of exposure drafts 
Our primary comment-letter-based measures of decreased “reliability” and increased 
“relevance” are sensitive to auditors’ distinct incentives, which may be endogenous to our 
explanatory variables. Accordingly, we use manual assessments by two research assistants, as 
discussed in Section 3 and Appendix B, as alternative dependent variables (Manual_dec_relb 
and Manual_inc_relv) to address this concern.  
Table 6 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for: (A) the exposure drafts common to 
both our manual and comment-letter sample (n=126); (B) the sub-sample of exposure drafts for 27 
 
which we only have manual assessments (n=19); and (C) the sub-sample of exposure drafts for 
which we only have auditor comment letters (n=23). Using a two-sample differences-in-means t-
test we compare the average values of explanatory variables across the three groups. Of 
particular note, Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC are significantly lower in sub-sample (C), while % 
Dem Donor FASB is significantly higher.  These differences are largely caused by data 
availability for the manually assessed sub-sample.  That sub-sample (columns (A) and (B)) 
excludes several exposure drafts from the early years of the FASB (1980s and before), a period 
characterized by lower values for Tenure FASB and Tenure SEC and higher values for % Dem 
Donor FASB, as shown in Figures 1–3.    
Table 6 Panel B presents OLS estimation results where Manual_dec_relb and 
Manual_inc_relv are the dependent variables. There are six columns to Table 6 Panel B: 
Manual_dec_relb is the dependent variable for the first three columns, Manual_inc_relv for the 
next three.  The first column for each dependent variable includes only regulators’ professional 
characteristics as independent variables; the second column for each dependent variable includes 
only regulators’ political characteristics as independent variables; the final column for each 
dependent variable includes both professional and political characteristics. In all columns, we 
include auditor fixed effects and the market-based controls.  Each regression is based on 126 
observations, one for each exposure draft where both auditor comment letters and manual 
assessments are available. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.  
The results in Table 6 Panel B show that % Financial FASB is a significant determinant 
of both Manual_dec_relb and Manual_inc_relv, which is consistent with regression results using 
auditor comment letters (Tables 4 and 5).  As in Table 4, we find a significant negative 
coefficient on % Dem Donor FASB in regressions on Manual_dec_relb that include only 28 
 
political variables; we do not find a similar result on Manual_inc_relv. In contrast to Table 4, in 
Table 6 Panel B we do not find significant coefficients on Tenure FASB, Tenure SEC, and % 
Financial SEC in regressions on Manual_dec_relb. The non-results on the tenure variables are 
likely explained by the exclusion of several exposure drafts in the Table 6 Panel B regressions 
due to data limitations, as discussed above.   
Overall, to summarize the key findings from Tables 4, 5, and 6: across tests using auditor 
comment letters and manual assessments of exposure drafts, the data are consistent with the 
proposition that a prior career in financial services predisposes FASB standard setters to favor 
accounting “relevance” over “reliability.” Our coding rubric for the manual assessment of 
exposure drafts’ focus on “relevance” over “reliability” relies on the use of fair-value methods in 
these proposals (see Appendix B for details). Thus, the key finding on financial services 
affiliation can be explained, in part, as the tendency of regulators with a financial services 
background to propose standards that use fair-value methods in recognition and disclosure. 
When combined with the descriptive evidence from Figure 2 and Table 3, which shows an 
increase in the proportion of FASB members from financial services from the mid-1990s through 
2007, this result can provide a partial explanation for the growth of fair-value accounting.  
 
5.3. Robustness and sensitivity tests 
With the small population of FASB and SEC regulators in our sample, there is a concern 
that one individual with an extremely strong personality can be driving the results described thus 
far. The analogous literature on managers and firm policies employs technologies around job-
switching to address this concern (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Due to the unique nature of 
the task we study, i.e., standard setting not corporate management, we cannot employ these 29 
 
technologies. An alternative robustness test is a jackknifing procedure where we re-estimate all 
our regressions successively eliminating each regulator (and reconstructing all independent 
variables accordingly) to determine if any member was instrumental to our statistical inferences. 
Unreported results obtained from this procedure are inconsistent with the proposition that any 
one FASB member is instrumental to the factors previously identified as statistically significant: 
Across 39 jackknifed subsamples—each eliminating one FASB member—we find no cases 
where elimination of an individual from our sample changes the sign or significance of our 
primary results.
19  
The implicit assumption underlying construction of our independent variables is that an 
exposure draft represents the average position of all extant FASB members and SEC 
commissioners; however, it is possible that the chairmen of these groups have greater influence 
than other members.  In unreported robustness tests, we examine the effects of assigning greater 
weight to FASB and SEC chairmen when calculating the average background characteristics of 
an extant board. In particular, we assign the background characteristics of FASB and SEC 
chairmen twice the weight of non-chair members. While the choice of doubling the weight on 
chairmen is admittedly arbitrary, the objective of this test is simply to assess whether the relative 
importance of FASB chairmen subsumes the results shown earlier. All substantive results 
discussed in Tables 4 and 5 are robust to the procedure described above.  
Finally, as discussed earlier, it is possible that the selection of a set of regulators on the 
FASB and SEC in a given time period depends, at least in part, on more fundamental 
macroeconomic conditions. Accordingly, we study the sensitivity of our results to these 
                                                            
19 The successive elimination of two FASB members in the jackknife procedure does turn, in some cases, the 
previously insignificant coefficient on %Auditor FASB significantly negative (as predicted): one of these members 
has a financial services background, the other an auditing background. One implication is that our failure to find 
evidence on %Auditor FASB in the regression that includes all independent variables is driven by the influential 
effects of these members. 30 
 
conditions. In restricting the sample to periods of expansion in the U.S. economy (as identified 
by the NBER), financial services background and Democratic Party affiliations remain 
significant predictors of increased “relevance” (inc_relv) and decreased “reliability” (dec_relb), 
consistent with results reported in Tables 4 and 5.  The only result from those tables not carrying 
through is the negative coefficient on % Rep Donor FASB on inc_relv for which we have no ex-
ante prediction and which is not consistent across all specifications.  
 
6. Conclusions  
Motivated by an interest in broadening the understanding of accounting standard setting 
beyond the role of constituent comment-letter lobbying and congressional intervention, we 
examine the role of FASB and SEC regulators in the process. Specifically, we examine how the 
professional and political characteristics of these regulators vary in the nature of exposure drafts 
proposed from 1973 to 2007. Because there is no obvious metric to evaluate the proposals, we 
rely principally on Big N auditors’ contemporaneous evaluations of the exposure drafts along 
dimensions of “reliability” and “relevance.” Our focus on “reliability” and “relevance” reflects 
our judgment on their importance to accounting, also evidenced in several leading accounting 
textbooks and in the FASB’s conceptual framework. The regulators’ professional characteristics 
we study are tenure, background in auditing, and background in financial services; the political 
characteristics are affiliation, if any, with the Democratic and Republican parties. Our key 
finding is that FASB members with a prior professional affiliation with the financial services 
industry are more likely to propose standards that decrease “reliability” and increase “relevance,” 
partly due to their tendency to propose fair-value methods of measurement. Given that the 
proportion of FASB members from the financial services industry has increased from the mid-31 
 
1990s to 2007, this finding can provide a partial explanation for the growth of fair-value 
accounting. We also find that FASB members affiliated with the Democratic Party are more 
likely to propose standards that increase “reliability” and decrease “relevance,” although only 
when excluding financial-services affiliation as an independent variable. Since our statistical 
inferences are based on a small population of FASB and SEC regulators, we conduct jackknifed 
sensitivity analyses: we find no evidence that any one regulator is driving inferences.  
Broadly, the paper provides a first empirical look at an important feature in the political 
economy of U.S. GAAP: the role of regulators at the FASB and SEC. While our research design 
does not allow us to distinguish whether the documented role of regulators derives from some 
intrinsic ideology of these individuals or from more primitive selection effects that place these 
regulators in office, our study takes the first important step of examining the impact of individual 
standard setters on standard setting (in the spirit of Bertrand and Schoar’s analogous study of 
managers on firm policies). Our study highlights opportunities for work on the question of how 
accounting regulators are chosen, including issues such as whether there is a “revolving door” 
between standard setters and special-interest groups. Moreover, as accounting institutions 
worldwide reorganize in response to globalization, such research can have important practical 
implications in the area of regulatory design.
20  
  
                                                            
20 For example, in the past five years, both Canada and China have undertaken some revamping of their standard-
setting institutions (e.g., Ramanna and Cheng, 2009; Ramanna, Donovan, and Dai, 2010). Further, in the U.S., 
between 2008 and 2010, the FASB has pared down and increased its membership from seven to five and back to 
seven, in order to “protect and maintain its efficiency” (FAF, 2008, 2010). Given the paucity of evidence to guide 
such structural changes, most, if not all of the institutional transformations have been ad hoc.  32 
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Appendix A 
Details of the process for creating auditor-based measures of decreased “reliability” and 
increased “relevance”  
 
We use a custom-designed Perl script to analyze the Big N auditors’ comments letters. 
For each comment letter, the Perl program first identifies all instances of the word stems 
“relevan” and “reliab.” The program then outputs: (1) the exact position within the comment 
letter where a word stem of interest occurs (the position of a word stem is reported as its word 
count from the beginning of the document); (2) the entire sentence containing the identified word 
stem; and (3) the total word count for the letter.  
Next, a research assistant (RA) trained in accounting principles, but blind to the intent of 
our study, manually examines both the first sentence referencing “relevan” and the first sentence 
referencing “reliab.” On each sentence, the RA determines whether the word stem in question is 
being used in: (1) a positive context, i.e., whether the letter is indicating that the proposed 
standard will increase “relevance”/ “reliability;” (2) a negative context, i.e., whether the letter is 
indicating that the proposed standard will decrease “relevance”/ “reliability;” or (3) a context that 
is irrelevant to the use of “relevance” and “reliability” as accounting principles. Examples of the 
RA’s assessments from actual sentences in the comment letters are below.  
 
  Positive context: “We support the approach followed in the Exposure Draft and believe 
that application of those standards will provide relevant and understandable information 
as well as an appropriate balance between comparability and flexibility.” Source: Arthur 
Andersen’s comment letter on proposed SFAS 117. 
  Negative context: “We also believe the Proposed Standard exacerbates the complexities 
of Statement 125 and permits recognition of revenue that cannot be reliably measured.” 
Source: Deloitte’s comment letter on proposed SFAS 140.  
  Irrelevant usage: “The auditor should familiarize himself with the relevant provisions of 
the partnership agreement.” Source: Arthur Andersen’s comment letter on proposed 
SFAS 102. 
 
In instances where the research assistant identifies the comment letter’s first use of 
“relevance”/ “reliability” as irrelevant to accounting principles, the RA proceeds to the second 
sentence containing the word stem in question. This process continues until the RA encounters 
either a positive or negative use of “relevance”/ “reliability” or the RA determines that all uses of 
“relevance”/ “reliability” in the comment letter are irrelevant to accounting principles.  
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Appendix B 
Coding rubric for research-assistant-based measures of decreased “reliability” and 
increased “relevance”  
 
The research assistants were instructed to evaluate the exposure drafts recording their 
perspective on whether the underlying proposal would decrease “reliability,” where “reliability” 
is defined as per the FASB as, “The quality of information that assures that information is 
reasonably free from error and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.” The 
resulting variable is a binary indicator denoted Manual_dec_relb. To obtain research assistants’ 
assessments of exposure drafts’ increased “relevance,” we rely on the following procedure: we 
asked the research assistants to score each exposure draft on the nature of its use of fair-value 
accounting. Our focus on “fair values” in measuring “increased relevance” is motivated by the 
FASB viewing the former as resulting in the latter (e.g., Johnson, 2005). In particular, research 
assistants scored each exposure draft on a score of 0–5, with unit scores for each of the 
following: (1) the introduction of fair-value accounting for asset write-downs; (2) the 
introduction of fair-value accounting for asset recognition and remeasurement; (3) the 
introduction of fair-value accounting for liability recognition and remeasurement; (4) the 
recognition of fair-value changes in the income statement; and (5) the required disclosure of fair-
value amounts.  The resulting count variable is denoted, Manual_inc_relv. 
Assessing  Manual_dec_relb and the components of Manual_inc_relv requires the 
exercise of professional judgment. Accordingly, both research assistants employed for this task 
are seasoned professionals, with MBA degrees from top-ranked U.S. business schools (as per 
U.S. News rankings) and with combined industrial work experience in finance and accounting 
exceeding thirty years. We recruited both research assistants specifically to evaluate the FASB 
exposure drafts, and both were selected for their practical familiarity with accounting. 
Of the 145 exposure drafts coded by the two research assistants, 105 received identical 
evaluations on Manual_dec_relb, while 114 received identical evaluations on Manual_inc_relv. 
On the exposure drafts with differing evaluations, the research assistants were able to resolve all 
differences in subsequent discussions. At no point in this process were the research assistants 
apprised of the study’s hypotheses or its independent variables. Research assistants were 
compensated on a flat hourly wage (i.e., no performance-based pay).  
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Appendix C 
Variable definitions 
 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION 
Dependent Variables    
  
inc_relv  Assessment that a proposed SFAS will increase accounting 
"relevance" as expressed by the Big 8/6/5/4 auditors (hereafter 
"Big N auditors") in their comment letters. See Section 3.  
  
dec_relb  Assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease accounting 
"reliability" as expressed by the Big N auditors in their comment 
letters.  See Section 3. 
  
Manual_inc_relv  Assessment that a proposed SFAS will increase "relevance" as 
determined by 2 independent reviewers.  See Section 3. 
  
Manual_dec_relb  Assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease "reliability" as 
determined by 2 independent reviewers.  See Section 3. 
FASB & SEC Professional Characteristics 
  
Tenure FASB  Exposure draft (ED)-level measure of the average tenure in years 
of all extant FASB members 
  
% Auditor FASB  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with 
most recent former employ in auditing. 
  
% Financial FASB  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with 
most recent former employ in investment banking/investment 
management 
  
Tenure SEC  ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC 
commissioners 
  
% Financial SEC  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners 
with most recent former employ in financial services 
FASB & SEC Political Characteristics 
  
%Rep Donor FASB  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members 
making campaign contributions to the Republican party or 
candidates. 
  
% Dem Donor FASB  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members 
making campaign contributions to the Democratic party or 
candidates 
  
% Democrat SEC  ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC 
commissioners. 
Other Variables    
  
VWRETD   Annual value-weighted market return (from CRSP) for the 12 
months directly preceding the month in which ED was issued. 
  
sd_VWRETD  Standard deviation of daily VWRETD (CRSP) for the 12 months 
directly proceeding the month in which an ED was issued 
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Appendix D 
Dependent variable scores by exposure draft 
 
 
SFAS ED Title  ED Date dec_ relb inc_ relv
Manual_
dec_relb
Manual_
inc_relv
SFAS001 Disclosure of Foreign Currency Translation Information 10/19/73 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS002 Accounting for Research and Development Costs 06/05/74 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS003 Reporting Accounting Changes in Interim Financial Statements: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 28 11/11/74 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS004 Reporting Gains and Losses and Extinguishments of Debt: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 30 01/31/75 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS005 Accounting for Contingencies 10/21/74 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS006 Classification of Short-term Obligations Expected to Be Refinanced: an amendment of ARB No. 43, 
Chapter 3, Section A
11/11/74
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS007 Accounting and Reporting by Development Stage Companies, Subsidiaries, Divisions and Other 
Components
07/19/74
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS008 Accounting for the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial 
Statements
12/31/74
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS009 Accounting for Income Taxes--Oil and Gas Producing Companies: an amendment of APB Opinions No. 
11 and 23
04/25/75
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS010 Extension of "Grandfather" Provisions for Business Combinations: An Amendment of APB Opinion No. 
16
09/08/75
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS011 Accounting for Contingencies--Transition Method: An Amendment of FASB Statement No.5 10/31/75 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS012 Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities 11/06/75 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS013 Accounting for Leases 08/26/75 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS013 Accounting for Leases: Revision of Exposure Draft Issued August 26, 1975  07/22/76 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS014 Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise 09/30/75 0.094 0.000 NA NA
SFAS015 Restructuring of Debt in a Troubled Loan Situation 11/07/75 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS015 Accounting by Debtors and Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructurings 12/30/76 NA NA 1.000 0.000
SFAS016 Prior Period Adjustments 07/29/76 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS017 Accounting for Leases--Initial Direct Costs: An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 13 08/08/77 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS018 Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise--Interim Financial Statements: An Amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 14
09/20/77
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS019 Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies 07/15/77 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS020 Accounting for Forward Exchange Contracts / an amendment of FASB Statement No. 8 11/07/77 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS021 Suspension of the Reporting of Earnings per Share and Segment Information by Nonpublic Enterprises: an 
amendment of APB Opinion No. 15 
02/27/78
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS022 
/SFAS023
Accounting for Leases: I  Inception of the Lease: An Amendment of FASB Statement No. 13 II Changes in 
the Provisions of Lease Agreements Resulting from Refundings of Tax-Exempt Debt: an amendment of 
FASB Statement No. 13 
12/19/77
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS024 Reporting Segment Information in Financial Statements That Are Presented With Another Enterprise's 
Financial Report: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 14
07/19/78
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS025 Suspension of Certain Accounting Requirements for Oil and Gas Producing Companies: an amendment of 
FASB Statement No. 19
11/07/78
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS026 Profit Recognition on Sales-Type Leases of Real Estate: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 13 12/22/78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS027 Classification of Renewals or Extensions of Existing Sales-Type or Direct Financing Leases: an amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 13
02/13/79
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS028 Accounting for Sales with Leasebacks: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 13 12/21/78 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS029 Determining Contingent Rentals 12/21/78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS030 Disclosure of Information about Major Customers: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 14 03/29/79 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS031 Accounting for Income Taxes Related to U.K. Tax Legislation Concerning Stock Relief 07/30/79 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS032 Specialized Accounting and Reporting Principles and Practices in AICPA Industry Accounting Guides, 
Industry Audit Guides, and Statements of Position: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 20
06/01/79
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS033 Financial Reporting in Units of General Purchasing Power 12/31/74 NA NA NA NA
SFAS033 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices 12/28/78 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS033 Constant Dollar Accounting: supplement to an exposure draft of a proposed Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting in Units of General Purchasing Power
03/02/79
0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS034 Capitalization of Interest Cost 12/15/78 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS035 Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans 04/14/77 0.000 0.116 1.000 4.000
SFAS035 Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans: revision of exposure draft issued April 14,  
1977 
07/09/79
NA NA 1.000 3.000
SFAS036 Disclosure of Pension and Other Post-Retirement Benefit Information: an amendment of APB Opinion 
No. 8
07/12/79
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS037 Balance Sheet Classification of Deferred Income Taxes: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 11 03/14/80 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS038 Accounting for Preacquisition Contingencies of Purchased Enterprises: an amendment of APB Opinion 
No. 16
12/26/79
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS039 
/SFAS040/S
FAS041
Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Specialized Assets—a supplement to FASB Statement No. 33 04/21/80
0.448 0.130 0.000 1.00039 
 
Appendix D …Cont. 
 
 
SFAS ED Title  ED Date dec_ relb inc_ relv
Manual_
dec_relb
Manual_
inc_relv
SFAS042 Determining Materiality for Capitalization of Interest Cost: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 34 04/22/80 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS043 Accounting for Compensated Absences 12/17/79 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS044 Accounting for Intangible Assets of Motor Carriers: an amendment of Chapter 5 of ARB 43 and an 
interpretation of APB Opinions 17 and 30
10/24/80
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS045 Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue 12/01/80 0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS046  Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Motion Picture Films; a supplement to FASB Statement No. 33 02/09/81
0.000 0.057 0.000 0.000
SFAS047 Disclosure of Guarantees, Project Financing Arrangements, and Other Similar Obligations: an amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 5
03/31/80
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS047 Disclosure of Obligations: I  Disclosure of Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others: an 
interpretation of FASB Statement No. 5 
11/14/80
NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS048 
/SFAS049
Accounting for Certain Product Sales I  Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists II  Accounting 
for Product Financing Arrangements
02/09/81
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS050 
/SFAS051 
/SFAS053 
/SFAS063
Accounting by the Entertainment Industry I  Motion Picture Films II Broadcasting  III Cable Television 
IV  Records & Music
06/12/81
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS052 Foreign Currency Translation 08/28/80 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS052 Foreign Currency Translation; revision of exposure draft issued August 28,1980 06/30/81 0.104 0.000 NA NA
SFAS054 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Investment Companies: an amendment of FASB Statement 
No.33
11/16/81
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS055 Determining whether a Convertible Security is a Common Stock Equivalent: an amendment of APB 
Opinion No. 15
11/06/81
0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS056 Applicability of FASB Statement No. 32 to AICPA Statements of Position and Guides on Accounting 
and Auditing Matters: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 32
11/06/81
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS057 Related Party Disclosures 11/06/81 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS058 Capitalization of Interest Cost in Financial Statements That Include Investments Accounted for by The 
Equity Method; an amendment of FASB 
09/30/81
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS059 Deferral of the Effective Date of Certain Accounting Requirements for Pension Plans of State and Local 
Governmental Units: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 35
02/22/82
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS060 
/SFAS061
Accounting by the Insurance Industry I  Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises II  
Accounting for Title Plant
11/18/81
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS062 Capitalization of Interest Cost in Situations Involving Tax-Exempt Borrowings and Certain Gifts and 
Grants: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 34
12/22/81
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS064 Extinguishment of Debt Made to Satisfy Sinking-Fund Requirements: an amendment of FASB Statement 
No. 4
02/23/82
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS065 Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities 02/03/82 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS066 
/SFAS067
Accounting for Certain Real Estate Transactions I  Accounting for Costs and Initial Rental Operations of 
Real Estate Projects II Accounting for Sales of Real Estate
12/15/81
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS068 Research and Development Arrangements 04/27/82 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS069 Disclosures about Oil and Gas Producing Activities: an amendment of FASB Statements 19 and 25 04/15/82 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SFAS070 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Foreign Currency Translation: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 33
12/22/81
NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS070 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Foreign Currency Translation: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 33 (Revision of 12/22/81 ED
08/19/82
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS071 Accounting for the Effects of Regulation of an Enterprise's Prices Based on Its Costs 03/04/82 0.061 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS072 Accounting for Certain Acquisitions of Banking or Thrift Institutions: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 
17 and an interpretation of APB Opinion No. 16
10/07/82
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS073 Reporting a Change in Accounting for Railroad Track Structures: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 20 04/12/83
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS074 Accounting for Special Termination Benefits Paid to Employees 12/28/82 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS075 Deferral of the Effective Date of Certain Accounting Requirements for Pension Plans of State and Local 
Governmental Units: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 35
06/07/83
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS076 Extinguishment of Debt and the Offsetting of Restricted Assets against Related Debt: an amendment of 
APB Opinion No. 26 and FASB Statement No. 34
10/13/82
NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS076 Extinguishment of Debt: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 26 (Revision of 10/31/82 ED) 07/14/83 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS077 Accounting and Reporting by Transferors for Transfers of Receivables with Recourse 11/18/81 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS077 Reporting by Transferors for Transfers of Receivables with Recourse (Revision of 11/18/81 ED) 08/31/82 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS078 Classification of Obligations That Are Callable by the Creditor: an amendment of Chapter 3A of ARB No. 
43
07/30/82
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS079 Elimination of Certain Disclosures for Business Combinations by Nonpublic Enterprises: an amendment 
of APB Opinion No. 16
10/04/83
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS080 Accounting for Futures Contracts 07/14/83 0.239 0.000 0.000 2.000
SFAS081 Disclosure of Postretirement Health Care and Life Insurance Benefits Information 07/03/84 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS082 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Elimination of Certain Disclosures: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 33
10/10/84
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS083 Designation of AICPA Guides and Statement of Position on Accounting by Brokers and Dealers in 
Securities,  by Employee Benefit Plans, and by Banks as Preferable for Purposes of Applying APB 
Opinion 20: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 32 and a rescission of FASB Interpretation No. 10
12/06/84
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS084 Induced Conversions of Convertible Debt: an amendment of APB Opinion No. 26 12/06/84 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS085 Yield Test for Determining whether a Convertible Security is a Common Stock Equivalent: an amendment 
of APB Opinion No. 15
12/06/84
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00040 
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SFAS ED Title  ED Date dec_ relb inc_ relv
Manual_
dec_relb
Manual_
inc_relv
SFAS086 Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed 08/31/84 0.471 0.000 1.000 2.000
SFAS087 Employers' Accounting for Pensions 03/22/85 0.096 0.000 NA NA
SFAS088 Employers' Accounting for Settlements and Curtailments of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and for 
Termination Benefits
06/14/85
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS089 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Current Cost Information 12/14/84 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS089 Financial Reporting and Changing Prices 09/30/86 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS090 
/SFAS092
Regulated Enterprises -- Accounting for Phase-in Plans, Abandonments, and Disallowances of Plant 
Costs: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 71
12/19/85
0.000 0.000 NA NA
SFAS091 Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with Originating and Acquiring Loans: an 
amendment of FASB Statements 13, 60, and 65 and a rescission of FASB Statement No. 17
12/31/85
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS093 Recognition of Depreciation by Not-for-Profit Organizations 12/23/86 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS094 Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries—an amendment of ARB No. 51, with related 
amendments of APB Opinion No. 18 and ARB No. 43, Chapter 12
12/16/86
0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
SFAS095 Reporting Income, Cash Flows, and Financial Position of Business Enterprises 11/16/81 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS095 Statement of Cash Flows 07/31/86 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.000
SFAS096 Accounting for Income Taxes 09/02/86 0.023 0.157 0.000 0.000
SFAS097 Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises for Certain Long-Duration Insurance Contracts and 
for Realized Gains and Losses from the Sale of Investments
12/23/86
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS098 Sale and Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate, Sales-Type Leases of Real Estate, Definition of 
the Lease Term, and Initial Direct Costs of Direct Financing Leases
08/31/87
NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS099 Deferral of the Effective Date of Recognition of Depreciation by Not-for-Profit Organizations 06/06/88 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS100 Accounting for Income Taxes—Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 96: an amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 96
10/13/88
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS101 Regulated Enterprises—Accounting for the Discontinuation of Application of FASB Statement No. 71 07/08/88 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS102 Statement of Cash Flows—Exemption of Certain Enterprises and Classification of Cash Flows from 
Certain Securities Held for Resale
11/30/88
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS103 Accounting for Income Taxes—Deferral of the Effective Date of FASB Statement No. 96: an amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 96
10/19/89
NA NA NA NA
SFAS104 Statement of Cash Flows—Net Reporting of Certain Cash Receipts and Cash Payments and Classification 
of Cash Flows from Hedging Transactions
07/25/89
0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000
SFAS105 Disclosure about Financial Instruments 11/30/87 NA NA 1.000 1.000
SFAS105 Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial 
instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk
07/21/89
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS106 Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions 02/14/89 0.533 0.000 1.000 4.000
SFAS107 Disclosures about Market Value of Financial Instruments 12/31/90 0.244 0.593 1.000 1.000
SFAS108 Accounting for Income Taxes—Deferral of the Effective Date of Statement No. 96, an amendment of 
FASB Statement No. 96
06/17/91
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS109 Accounting for Income Taxes 06/05/91 NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS110 Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans of Investment Contracts: an amendment of FASB Statement 
No. 35
03/20/92
0.000 0.326 1.000 1.000
SFAS111 Rescission of FASB Statement No. 32 and Technical Corrections 06/30/92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS112 Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 43 05/12/92 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS113 Accounting and Reporting for Reinsurance of Short-Duration and Long-Duration Contracts 03/20/92 0.049 0.121 0.000 0.000
SFAS114 Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 15 06/30/92 0.210 0.124 1.000 2.000
SFAS115 Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities 09/09/92 0.507 0.000 1.000 4.000
SFAS116 Accounting for Contributions Received and Contributions Made and Capitalization of Works of Art, 
Historical Treasurers, and Similar Assets
10/31/90
0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000
SFAS116 Accounting for Contributions Received and Contributions Made (Revision of 10/31/90 ED) 11/17/92 0.379 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS117 Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations 10/23/92 0.000 0.589 0.000 0.000
SFAS118 Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan—Income Recognition: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 114
03/31/94
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS119 Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments 04/14/94 0.000 0.137 0.000 1.000
SFAS120 Accounting and Reporting by Mutual Life Insurance Enterprises and by Insurance Enterprises for Certain 
Long-Duration Participating Contracts: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 60, 97, and 113 (Includes 
Proposed AICPA Statement of Position, Accounting for Certain Insurance Activities of Mutual Life 
Insurance Enterprises)
03/24/94
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS121 Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets 11/29/93 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000
SFAS122 Accounting for Mortgage Servicing Rights and Excess Servicing Receivables and for Securitization of 
Mortgage Loans an amendment of FASB Statement No. 65
06/28/94
0.148 0.030 1.000 4.000
SFAS123 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation 06/30/93 0.372 0.000 1.000 2.000
SFAS123R Share-Based Payment: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 123 and 95 03/31/04 0.318 0.466 0.000 2.000
SFAS124 Accounting for Certain Investments Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations 03/31/95 NA NA 0.000 3.00041 
 
Appendix D …Cont. 
 
SFAS ED Title  ED Date dec_ relb inc_ relv
Manual_
dec_relb
Manual_
inc_relv
SFAS125 Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities 10/24/95 0.510 0.120 1.000 2.000
SFAS126 Elimination of Certain Disclosures abut Financial Instruments by Small Nonpublic Entities: an amendment 
of FASB Statement No. 107
09/20/96
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS127 Deferral of the Effective Date of Certain Provisions of FASB Statement No. 125: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 125
11/11/96
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS128 
/SFAS129
Earnings per Share and Disclosure of Information about Capital Structure 01/19/96
0.000 0.135 0.000 0.000
SFAS130 Reporting Comprehensive Income 06/20/96 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS131 Reporting Disaggregated Information about a Business Enterprise 01/19/96 0.018 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS132 Employers' Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits: an amendment of FASB 
Statements No. 87, 88, and 106
06/30/97
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SFAS132R Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits: an amendment of FASB 
Statements No. 87, 88, and 106 and a replacement of FASB Statement No. 132
09/12/03
0.163 0.131 0.000 1.000
SFAS133 Accounting for Derivative and Similar Financial Instruments and for Hedging Activities 06/20/96 0.101 0.046 1.000 3.000
SFAS134 Accounting for Mortgage-Backed Securities and Certain Other Interests Retained after the Securitization 
of Mortgage Loans Held for Sale by a Mortgage Banking Enterprise: an amendment of FASB Statement 
No. 65
4/10;98
0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000
SFAS135 Amendments to FASB Statement No. 66, Rescission of FASB Statement No. 75, and Technical 
Corrections
10/13/98
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS136 Transfers of Assets in Which a Not-for-Profit Organization Acts as an Agent, Trustee, or Intermediary: an 
Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 116
12/29/95
NA NA 0.000 0.000
SFAS136 Transfers of Assets involving a Not-for-Profit Organization That Raises or Holds Contributions for 
Others
07/17/98
0.000 0.000 0.000 3.000
SFAS137 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—Deferral of the Elective Date of FASB 
Statement No. 133: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 133
05/20/99
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS138 Accounting for Certain Derivative instruments and Certain Hedging Activities: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 133
03/03/00
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS139 Rescission of FASB Statement No. 53 10/16/98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS140 Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 125 06/28/99 0.378 0.000 1.000 2.000
SFAS141 
/SFAS142
Business Combinations and Intangible Assets 09/07/99
0.461 0.152 1.000 3.000
SFAS141R Business Combinations: a replacement of FASB Statement No. 141 06/30/05 0.909 0.477 1.000 5.000
SFAS142 Business Combinations and Intangible Assets—Accounting for Goodwill (Revision of 9/7/99 ED) 02/14/01 0.647 0.041 1.000 3.000
SFAS143 Accounting for Certain Liabilities Related to Closure or Removal of Long-Lived Assets 02/07/96 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SFAS143 Accounting for Obligations Associated with the Retirement of Long-Lived Assets (Revision of 2/7/96 ED) 02/17/00
0.452 0.278 1.000 0.000
SFAS144 
/SFAS146
Rescission of FASB Statements No. 4, 44, and 64 and Technical Corrections 11/15/01
0.158 0.376 1.000 2.000
SFAS145 Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets and for Obligations Associated with 
Disposal Activities
06/30/00
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS145 Rescission of FASB Statements No. 4, 44, and 64 and Technical Corrections—Amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 13 (Revision of 11/15/01 ED)
02/14/02
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS147 Acquisitions of Certain Financial Institutions: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 72 and No. 144 and 
FASB Interpretation No. 9
05/10/02
0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000
SFAS148 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation--Transition and Disclosure: and amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 123
10/04/02
0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SFAS149 Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities 05/01/02 0.132 0.000 0.000 1.000
SFAS150 Accounting for Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Liabilities: Equity, or Both 10/27/00 0.297 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS151 Inventory Costs: an amendment of ARB No. 43, Chapter 4 12/15/03 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS152 Accounting for Real Estate Time-Sharing Transactions: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 66 and 67 02/20/03
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SFAS153 Exchanges of Productive Assets: an amendment of ABP Opinion No. 29 12/15/03 0.161 0.000 1.000 1.000
SFAS154 Accounting Changes and Error Corrections: a replacement of ABP Opinion No. 20 and FASB Statement 
No. 3
12/15/03
0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
SFAS155 Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments: an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 
140
08/11/05
0.190 0.397 1.000 2.000
SFAS156 Qualifying Special-Purpose Entities and Isolation of Transferred Assets: an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 140
06/10/03 NA NA 1.000 0.000
SFAS156 Accounting for Servicing of Financial Assets: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140  (Revision of 
6/10/03 ED)
08/11/05 0.003 0.113 1.000 4.000
SFAS156 Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets: an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140 (Revision of 
6/10/03 ED)
08/11/05 NA NA 1.000 0.000
SFAS157 Fair Value Measurements 06/23/04 0.599 0.245 0.000 2.000
SFAS158 Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans: an amendment of 
FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R)
03/31/06
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SFAS159 The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities: Including an amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 115
01/25/06
0.451 0.669 1.000 4.000
SFAS160 Consolidated Financial Statements, Including Accounting and Reporting of Noncontrolling Interests in 
Subsidiaries: a replacement of ARB No. 51
06/30/05
0.586 0.000 1.000 4.00042 
 
Figure 1 
Average tenure of FASB members and SEC commissioners by proposed SFAS, 1973–2007 
The sample is the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed comment 
letters. Tenure FASB is an exposure draft (ED)-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB 
members. Tenure SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. 
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Figure 2 
Proportion of FASB members and SEC commissioners with prior employment in auditing 
and financial services  
The sample is the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed comment 
letters. % Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former 
employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with 
most recent former employ in investment banking/ investment management. % Financial SEC is an ED-level 
measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in financial services. 
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Figure 3 
Proportion of FASB members and SEC commissioners by political identity 
The sample is the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed comment 
letters. %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign 
contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion 
of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. % Democrat SEC 
is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC commissioners. 
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Table 1 
Big N auditor comment-letter availability 
The sample is the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed comment 
letters.   
 46 
 
Table 2  
Summary statistics of and correlations between measures of decreased “reliability” and 
increased “relevance”  
The sample is based on 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007. inc_relv is an assessment that a 
proposed SFAS will increase accounting “relevance” as expressed by the Big 8/6/5/4 auditors (hereafter “Big N 
auditors”) in their comment letters. dec_relb is an assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease accounting 
“reliability” as expressed by the Big N auditors in their comment letters. Manual_inc_relv is an assessment that a 
proposed SFAS will increase “relevance” as determined by two independent reviewers. Manual_dec_relb is an 
assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease “reliability” as determined by two independent reviewers. See 
Section 3 for details.  
 
PANEL A: Summary statistics 
  
Variable  Mean     Median     S.D.     Maximum     Minimum    
dec_relb  0.07     0.00     0.22     0.99     0.00    
inc_relv  0.04     0.00     0.17     0.98     0.00    
Manual_dec_relb  0.31     0.00     0.46     1.00     0.00    
Manual_inc_relv  0.65     0.00     1.20     5.00     0.00    
 
 
 
PANEL B: Pearson correlations (Spearman above the diagonal)  
 
   Variable  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)    
(1)  dec_relb  1.000     0.205  **  0.347  ***  0.502  *** 
(2)  inc_relv  0.225  ***  1.000     0.151  *  0.238  *** 
(3)  Manual_dec_relb  0.341  ***  0.147  *  1.000     0.596  *** 
(4)  Manual_inc_relv  0.502  ***  0.203  **  0.609  ***  1.000    
Significance levels: (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test with S.E. 
clustered by SFAS 
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Table 3 Panel A 
Summary statistics on explanatory variables 
The sample is based on the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed 
comment letters. Tenure FASB is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. 
% Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former 
employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with 
most recent former employ in investment banking/ investment management. %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level 
measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Republican Party or 
candidates.  % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making 
campaign contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. Tenure SEC is an ED-level measure of the average 
tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. % Financial SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of 
extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in financial services. % Democrat SEC is an ED-level 
measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC commissioners. 
 
 
 
    
Variable Mean Median S.D. Maximum Minimum
FASB & SEC Professional Characteristics
Tenure FASB 4.2 4.3 1.5 6.7 0.6
% Auditor FASB 39.52% 42.86% 7.80% 57.14% 16.67%
% Financial FASB 4.35% 0.00% 8.05% 28.57% 0.00%
Tenure SEC 3.1 3.0 1.2 6.2 0.2
% Financial SEC  15.15% 20.00% 16.62% 66.67% 0.00%
FASB & SEC Political Characteristics
% Rep Donor FASB 18.01% 14.29% 12.37% 42.86% 0.00%
% Dem Donor FASB 16.73% 14.29% 17.20% 66.67% 0.00%
% Democrat SEC 44.99% 40.00% 20.22% 100.00% 0.00%48 
 
Table 3 Panel B 
Pearson correlations between explanatory variables (Spearman above the diagonal) 
The sample is based on the 157 proposed SFAS issued between 1973 and 2007 on which the Big N auditors filed comment letters. Tenure FASB is an ED-level 
measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. % Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with 
most recent former employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in 
investment banking/ investment management. %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign 
contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign 
contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. Tenure SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. % 
Financial SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in financial services. % Democrat SEC is 
an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC commissioners.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Tenure FASB 1.000 -0.255 *** 0.022 0.002 -0.155 * 0.441 *** -0.447 *** 0.020
(2) % Auditor FASB -0.276 *** 1.000 -0.405 *** 0.295 *** -0.175 ** 0.229 *** 0.787 *** 0.175 **
(3) % Financial FASB -0.035 -0.311 *** 1.000 -0.356 *** 0.351 *** -0.066 -0.448 *** 0.348 ***
(4) Tenure SEC 0.053 0.282 *** -0.365 *** 1.000 -0.306 *** 0.531 *** 0.093 0.193 **
(5)% Financial SEC  -0.122 -0.215 *** 0.403 *** -0.320 *** 1.000 -0.222 *** -0.245 *** -0.146 *
(6) % Rep Donor FASB 0.428 *** 0.216 *** -0.067 0.529 *** -0.275 *** 1.000 -0.108 0.346 ***
(7) % Dem Donor FASB -0.521 *** 0.519 *** -0.320 *** -0.030 -0.249 *** -0.284 *** 1.000 0.052
(8) % Democrat SEC 0.068 0.149 * 0.336 *** 0.135 * -0.341 *** 0.284 *** 0.022 1.000
FASB/SEC
Political 
Characteristics
FASB/SEC
Professional 
Characteristics
FASB/SEC Political Charac. FASB/SEC Professional Characteristics49 
 
Table 4 
OLS regression of dec_relb on the characteristics of FASB members and SEC 
commissioners 
Sample is 908 big auditor comment letters written on 149 exposure drafts that became 157 SFAS issued between 
1973 and 2007. dec_relb is an assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease accounting “reliability” as expressed 
by the Big N auditors in their comment letters. See Section 3 for details. Tenure FASB is an ED-level measure of the 
average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. % Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of 
extant FASB members with most recent former employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of 
the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in investment banking/ investment 
management.  %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making 
campaign contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the 
proportion of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. Tenure 
SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. % Financial SEC is an 
ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in financial 
services. % Democrat SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC commissioners. The 
market variables are VWRETD and sd_VWRETD.  VWRETD is the annual value-weighted market return (from 
CRSP) for the 12 months directly preceding the month in which a proposed SFAS was issued. sd_VWRETD is the 
standard deviation of daily VWRETD for the 12 months directly preceding the month in which a proposed SFAS was 
issued. Figures in italics and parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Significance levels: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.
All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 Tenure FASB 0.0086 0.0137 * 0.0140 * 0.0129
(0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0148)
  % Auditor FASB -0.1824 -0.1597 -0.1679 -0.1943
(0.2119) (0.2099) (0.2069) (0.2142)
  % Financial FASB 0.6668 *** 0.6672 *** 0.6438 *** 0.5506 **
(0.2047) (0.1994) (0.2024) (0.2211)
  Tenure SEC 0.0196 * 0.0216 * 0.0220 ** 0.0202
(0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0128)
  % Financial SEC 0.1804 0.2101 * 0.2075 * 0.2393 *
(0.1108) (0.1254) (0.1258) (0.1381)
% Rep Donor FASB -0.0516 -0.07579 -0.0686 0.0099
(0.1270) (0.1144) (0.1143) (0.1889)
 % Dem Donor FASB -0.2540 *** -0.26618 *** -0.2615 *** -0.0102
(0.0764) (0.0809) (0.0787) (0.0664)
% Democrat SEC 0.0703 0.080215 0.0794 0.0513
(0.0793) (0.0845) (0.0849) (0.0939)
Market Vars No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No Auditor No No Auditor Auditor
S.E. Cluster SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
N Obs 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R-Sq 0.1013 0.1067 0.1233 0.0383 0.0412 0.0616 0.1245
Professional characteristics Political characteristics50 
 
Table 5 
OLS regression of inc_relv on the characteristics of FASB members and SEC 
commissioners 
Sample is 908 big auditor comment letters written on 149 exposure drafts that became 157 SFAS issued between 
1973 and 2007. inc_relv is an assessment that a proposed SFAS will increase accounting “relevance” as expressed 
by the Big 8/6/5/4 auditors (hereafter “Big N auditors”) in their comment letters. See Section 3 for details. Tenure 
FASB is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. % Auditor FASB is an 
ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in auditing. % 
Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ 
in investment banking/ investment management. %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of 
extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB 
is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the 
Democratic Party or candidates. Tenure SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC 
commissioners. % Financial SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most 
recent former employ in financial services. % Democrat SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant 
Democratic SEC commissioners. The market variables are VWRETD and sd_VWRETD. VWRETD is the annual 
value-weighted market return (from CRSP) for the 12 months directly preceding the month in which a proposed 
SFAS was issued. sd_VWRETD is the standard deviation of daily VWRETD for the 12 months directly preceding the 
month in which a proposed SFAS was issued. Figures in italics and parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Significance levels: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level using a two-tailed t-test.   
All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 Tenure FASB 0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0001
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0051)
  % Auditor FASB -0.1852 -0.2096 -0.2105 -0.1150
(0.1362) (0.1410) (0.1412) (0.1042)
  % Financial FASB 0.3388 * 0.3516 * 0.3634 * 0.5514 ***
(0.1973) (0.1935) (0.1937) (0.1933)
  Tenure SEC 0.0025 0.0021 0.0019 0.0056
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0053)
  % Financial SEC 0.0927 0.0708 0.0720 -0.0052
(0.0717) (0.0777) (0.0782) (0.0676)
% Rep Donor FASB -0.1722 * -0.158942 * -0.1624 * -0.0441
(0.1017) (0.0921) (0.0942) (0.1275)
 % Dem Donor FASB -0.1608 *** -0.1497 ** -0.1520 ** -0.0432
(0.0609) (0.0598) (0.0611) (0.0627)
% Democrat SEC -0.0043 -0.01291 -0.0122 -0.1090
(0.0884) (0.0874) (0.0881) (0.0963)
Market Vars No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No Auditor No No Auditor Auditor
S.E. Cluster SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
SFAS 
Auditor
N Obs 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
R-Sq 0.0594 0.0634 0.0681 0.03 0.032 0.0349 0.0775
Professional characteristics Political characteristics51 
 
Table 6A 
Differences in means of explanatory variables across the comment-letter and manually 
assessed sub-samples 
Two-sample differences-in-means t-tests are performed on pairs of three distinct sub-samples.  Sub-sample A is the 
126 exposure drafts for which we have both manual assessments and auditor comment letters. Sub-sample B is the 
19 exposure drafts for which we have manual assessments but no auditor comment letters.  Sub-sample C is the 23 
exposure drafts for which we have auditor comment letters but no manual assessments.  Tenure FASB is an ED-level 
measure of the average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. % Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the 
proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level 
measure of the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in investment banking/ 
investment management. %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members 
making campaign contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure 
of the proportion of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. 
Tenure SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. % Financial 
SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in 
financial services. % Democrat SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC 
commissioners. 
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Table 6B 
OLS regression of Manual_dec_relb and Manual_inc_relv on the characteristics of FASB 
members and SEC commissioners 
Sample is the 126 exposure drafts for which we have both auditor comment letters and manual assessments (See 
Table 9A). Manual_inc_relv is an assessment that a proposed SFAS will increase “relevance” as determined by two 
independent reviewers. Manual_dec_relb is an assessment that a proposed SFAS will decrease “reliability” as 
determined by two independent reviewers. See Section 3 for details. Tenure FASB is an ED-level measure of the 
average tenure in years of all extant FASB members. % Auditor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of 
extant FASB members with most recent former employ in auditing. % Financial FASB is an ED-level measure of 
the proportion of extant FASB members with most recent former employ in investment banking/ investment 
management.  %Rep Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant FASB members making 
campaign contributions to the Republican Party or candidates. % Dem Donor FASB is an ED-level measure of the 
proportion of extant FASB members making campaign contributions to the Democratic Party or candidates. Tenure 
SEC is an ED-level measure of the average tenure in years of all extant SEC commissioners. % Financial SEC is an 
ED-level measure of the proportion of extant SEC commissioners with most recent former employ in financial 
services. % Democrat SEC is an ED-level measure of the proportion of extant Democratic SEC commissioners. The 
market variables are VWRETD and sd_VWRETD.  VWRETD is the annual value-weighted market return (from 
CRSP) for the 12 months directly preceding the month in which a proposed SFAS was issued. sd_VWRETD is the 
standard deviation of daily VWRETD for the 12 months directly preceding the month in which a proposed SFAS was 
issued. Figures in italics and parentheses are standard errors. 
 
  
Significance levels: (*) 10% level, (**) 5% level, (***) 1% level using a two-tailed t-test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Tenure FASB 0.0313 0.0551 0.0015 0.0302
(0.0352) (0.0448) (0.0943) (0.1241)
  % Auditor FASB -0.8485 -0.2959 -2.1387 -1.6739
(0.5551) (0.7059) (1.4911) (1.8935)
  % Financial FASB 1.3714 ** 1.9236 *** 5.8551 *** 8.7955 ***
(0.5541) (0.6928) (1.6954) (1.9482)
  Tenure SEC 0.0250 0.0588 0.0467 0.1058
(0.0419) (0.0495) (0.1008) (0.1292)
  % Financial SEC 0.2801 0.0261 0.8158 -0.3722
(0.3030) (0.3493) (0.8384) (0.9230)
% Rep Donor FASB -0.7617 * -0.7157 -2.3263 *** -0.2012
(0.4181) (0.5874) (0.8732) (1.3590)
 % Dem Donor FASB -0.6918 ** -0.1197 -1.2018 0.8250
(0.3165) (0.3951) (1.0331) (1.3185)
% Democrat SEC 0.0833 -0.2491 -0.0319 -1.8942 ***
(0.2231) (0.2971) (0.5728) (0.6855)
Market Vars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F i x e d  E f f e c t s N oN oN oN oN oN o
S.E. Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
N Obs 126 126 126 126 126 126
R-Sq 0.1253 0.0717 0.1482 0.2771 0.0696 0.3294
Manual_dec_relb Manual_inc_relv